Out of Pod Experience

They were line ships - the battlecruisers were intended for use as such in both the RN and KM official naval tactics of the time and used as such. Did the RN BCs serve well in that function? No, in retrospect it was apparent that it was a mistake. Perhaps if the RN had kept the compartment doors shut not exposing the entirety of their 22" flash-happy cordite to catastrophic explosion, it may have been different, but it was what it was.

But none of them were lost were lost in "duels" with "battleships" - all battlecruisers lost at Jutland were lost to other battlecruisers. And the KM BCs were effective whereas the RN BCs were not - their use was a tactical success for the KM and a failure for the RN.

And again, battlecruisers were no less a capital ship than a dreadnought.

Their primary function was whatever the official doctrine of the RN and KM said they were, and the RN and KM doctrine was for them to join the line during major engagements such as what happened at Jutland.

If you'd read Beatty's memo on the issue, for example, among four other purposes designated for RN battlecruisers, joining the line was one of them. Just because the doctrine designates a certain purpose for them doesn't exclude other purposes and uses. One of the intended purposes for a dreadnought was to bombard coastal defense batteries, that didn't exclude it from other uses.

There was no HMS Hood at Jutland, no ship existed by that name in 1916. A mothballed HMS Hood was scuttled to block a harbor in England in 1914, and the other was launched in 1920 and sunk in 1941 during WWII. Rear Admiral Hood commanded the 3rd BCS. No battlecruisers were lost to dreadnoughts at Jutland, only other battlecruisers. A KM pre-dreadnought was lost to an RN submarine.

The problem with not having battlecruisers in a battle involving dreadnoughts in 1916 is that the side who brought them would be able to dictate the terms of engagement at will with regards to battlecruisers vis-a-vis dreadnoughts, because they were faster and more maneuverable while packing the same basic punch as a dreadnought. For one side to not have them there could very well effectively ended up suiciding their dreadnought fleet. BCs were necessary to counter the other side's BCs (which is what happened), lest you have 6 or 8 BCs leisurely sniping off dreadnoughts one-by-one until you run out of dreadnoughts. And if the dreadnoughts needed to GTFO, they'd be unable to run from BCs.

The primary gist of your posts has come across as minimizing the loss of the battlecruisers, as if it were some minor ship like a cruiser or a destroyer or somehow a lesser ship than the dreadnoughts were. Which they weren't. These BCs were twice the size of the Russian battleships that went down at Tsushima, and often outclassed contemporary dreadnoughts in many respects.

As far as Tsushima goes - I imagine it would be 1h 45m covering the period of the week where Japanese scouts relayed the exact position of the Russian fleet back to their fleet, and the last 15 minutes would be a badly outfitted, poorly commanded Russian fleet at the end of a 10,000 mile journey blindly sailing into a trap. Not exactly suspenseful or filled with any surprises. Except for the Russians.

Yes, they were the primary line ships but that doesn't minimize BCs in any way, shape or form. The BCs were equally capital ships, and the side without them can kiss a great deal of their dreadnoughts goodbye. The fact that the RN had battlecruisers at Jutland prevented the Germans from sinking RN dreadnoughts.

I'm not sure what you're describing in your space battle, but it's not parallel to Tsushima. 4 excellent battleships with a great support fleet squaring off against 8 sub-par battleships with little support. The Japanese fleet wasn't outnumbered in anything but battleships - the Japanese had a 3-1 overall in ships deployed.

Those "small battleships" were mobile coastal defense batteries on floating platforms that had no reason being at sea. The Russians were worse off for them being there. Their presence essentially dictated that the Russians sail through the Strait of Tsushima, whereas without them they fleet have the freedom to go around Japan through the North Pacific to reach Vladivostok. That and those "small battleships" were utterly useless in a sea battle.

I'm not sure if the Russians were wholly expecting an engagement en route bringing them along, but then again these are the same people who built a 400 mile straight railway between St. Petersburg and Moscow because that's how Tsar drew it on the map.

If you're really this unaware of the deficiencies of the Russian fleet, and the advantages of the Japanese fleet, you should read a book or something. Just because you see 8 battleships against 4 on two lines of text on Wikipedia doesn't mean there's enormously more to it than that.

The Japanese David vs. Goliath narrative on the battle may seem romantic and exciting and all, but doesn't stack up against the reality that the Japanese were not outmatched and had a pretty decisive advantage.

I'd rather see Das Boot in space.

Well, that's where we can agree to disagree. I don't think the Russian fleet had a snowball's chance in hell at that location with those circumstances. Maybe if it were the Japanese fleet that had sailed into the Baltic and the battle were fought 20 miles off Kronstadt I'd have a different opinion.