Intergalactic Summit

An incomplete knowledge of the total facts used to reach a conclusion does not make that conclusion accurate or true.

So, yes, we can still legitimately categorize them as being different, especially if we are aware of that critical difference. If we are not aware, it is plausible you could come to the wrong conclusion and mistake something as genuinely human, but that does not make it human.

Consider the similarities with art forgery.

You've struck a chord with my inner mushy self, Katrina, by comparing a human to a work of art and contrasting it with my analogies to a machine.

On a fundamental level I agree.

Reading this, I have to add a few sentences to my prior post, Cpt. Moros:

I think the problem here is that you're looking at what a human is merely on the grounds of natural sciences. Those have their merits, but they also have their limitations. Those limits are already crossed if one tries to apply them as you do, I think. Especially in the worldviews of transhumanism (s.str.) and posthumanism the reach of the natural sciences is usually overstrained: It's tried to show within the framework of the scientific paradigm that the technoscientifically enhanced human is 'better' in some absolute sense. The absolute 'better' is something that lies beyond natural science, though. I've the feeling that you step into just the same trap as so many other transhumanists did.

Natural science can merely account for a 'better than x for y given the standard z etc.'. It can only talk about a better that is bound up in relations, relations that can only concern the world as conceived by the natural sciences. And that's always an incomplete picture. The idea that better conditions for humans or a wider array of open possibilities for humans, more tools for them to use make better humans - again, better in that absolute sense - is an utopian idea that has time and again proven to be wrong and must be wrong if one understands that all these things don't necessitate humans to be better in any way, neither ethically or in any relative sense nor in any absolute sense.

In the end, I think science is better left with what it's meant for, while the idea of transcending mere humanity is better looked after by the disciplines meant to deal with it: philosophy and theology. One shouldn't forget that there are disciplinary borders for a reason. Natural sciences are perfectly suited to help us better the conditions humans live in. They are awfully misplaced if one tries to use them in an attempt to make better humans or exalt the conditio humana.

- N. Mithra

I feel no compunction to weigh in on this discussion, but I do have question for Mr. Moros and Mr Thessalonia. We have a group of Matriculants that have expressed interest in spending time with you folks, learning about Nation. They have been given access to all discussions on these forums including this one. The decision is theirs, but perhaps some words to help them understand what that process would involve are appropriate. What would "trans-humanism" mean for these ordinary humans is they were to come under your direction?

Unfortunately, I find myself with a distinct shortage of time this evening owing to a particularly pressing logistical concern. Shaalira D'arc, Kat Robspierre, Vechtor, Nicoletta Mithra and Deceiver's Voice have all made excellent points that I would be belittling to even attempt to respond to in so short a time -- not, of course, forgetting the contributions made by Rek Jaiga, Katrina Oniseki, and Lyn Farel, but I discovered the majority of what I had to offer to that branch of discussion immediately to have already been covered by the time I sat down to read.

I shall write my responses to the aforementioned tomorrow, I hope, but, nevertheless, commenting where the brief remarks my schedule allows are suitable:

Rek Jaiga, Katrina Oniseki, and Lyn Farel.
As stated, much of what I would have said here has already been brought up, and I lack the time necessary to introduce any new ideas in any in-depth sense. There is one thing I would wish to mention, however, related to the analogy of a piece of artwork.

Take, for instance, a painting. We can reduce that painting down to the most infinitesimally small dots of colour -- or so far as atoms, to take the example to an unrealistic extreme. The painting is, at its core, these dots of colour; they are the constituent components that make up the artwork. Suppose we then copy the first such dot of colour exactly, and the next, and so on until there are no more dots left to copy.

We find ourselves with a perfect copy of the original, indistinguishable in every sense. Does the copy lack any artistic or moral value that the original possesses? Phrased differently, can something be more than the sum of its parts, having some "essence" that resists duplication? I do not believe so, but I am curious as to what others would say.

Manwe Todako.
While this is at best tangential to the discussion at hand, I feel that it would be best covered here, at least initially, since it was brought up in a public forum and not a private message.

I confess, I am unsure what you are asking. If these people wish to spend time with the Foundations in order to learn about the Nation, then the decision ultimately lies with my Overseer, i.e. Ghost Hunter, but I see no immediately obvious reason why they would be forbidden. If they wish to bypass the Foundations, I can offer a visit to one of the colonies of the Safe Harbour Project within Stain.

During either stay, these people would be shown what they wish to see, within our abilities to do so without endangering our own operations -- for instance, we would of course be unable to share with them the contents of any restricted files; this is something common to many corporations and similar groups, Capsuleer-operated or otherwise. They would not be subject to any particular implantation unless they specifically requested it, from either of the Foundations or Safe Harbour. Their own takes, or lacks thereof, on transhumanism would remain as they were, unless an observation of National approaches to such influenced them, either in favour of or against it.

Beyond that, I am not certain what I can say. Perhaps further clarification would be preferable in a Neocom message? Feel free to publish the contents of any such messages in your main DSTON thread if you would prefer the transparency, but it would avoid having three simultaneous discussions in here.

Mlle. Farel raises a key observation. We are using physical manifestations (our virtually inexhaustible supply of clones) to discuss a metaphysical concept - what it means to be human, or transhuman, or posthuman.

Of course, that is the very question we are debating: how do our physical changes alter our metaphysical properties.

My definition of "same" does not extend to similar people or individuals of the same species. They are indeed not, to my understanding. Let me clarify how I define this :

Stricto sensu it is right that a copy of an original item is not the same considering its position in space. It is also only 100% similar in essence at its creation at t=0, but the very millisecond after, it already starts to become something else, unless it does not react to its direct environnement. Though I took above the liberty to use the word "same" by convenience. This is the same thing with a person : duplicate it as much as you want and it will be the exact same person at t=0, minus its position into space. After even the smallest bit of time though, he/she starts to react differently according to his/her own environnement.

Now then, about the history of a copy or a duplicate, I must respectfuly disagree. As I said in my previous message, abstract concepts attached to something are shared by all its versions, be them copies or not. What is valuable in the original will always be in the copy too (to the condition it is a perfect copy). Unless you are refering to the history of the constituents themselves of the item which are purely physical (like, the particules constituting the painting...), the history behind it can also be considered to be the history of the achievements and what the thing has witnessed in its entire life, and this is barely a physical concrete idea. Some people might prefer to care about the history of the matter and elements (what constitues the item), while other will prefer to care about the more abstract history standing behind the item, and not its constituents. Where it becomes interesting is as soon as one creates a copy of something with a history behind, it might share its history until t=0 (time when duplicated), but will inevitably start to create its own history after.

Also, you definitly raise an interesting point in saying that artificially created human minds that have never been embodied might not be able to be considered as human. But any other copy or creation of a human having shared that body experience, should remain one. Where it gets tricky is on a more subjective matter : can such an entity that has very briefly been embodied in a distant past be still considered as human ?

My apologies for being unable to do this yesterday.

Vechtor and Deceiver's Voice.
Vechtor's point has merit, I feel; Deceiver's Voice touched upon that the distinctions of "human", "transhuman" and "posthuman" rarely enter into day-to-day thought processes -- and I agree. It is part of why I am fond of blurring the distinction between the three categories. The desire for the perceived benefit offered by, say, the cybernetic prothesis is often that from which the ultimate decision is drawn, not any particular desire to "be" trans- or posthuman.

As for the point of Capsuleers "never ending to be humans", I feel that is better addressed another time. The argument of the Capsuleer's humanity can be an engaging one, approached properly and in structured format -- but to do so here would result in a loss of that same proper approach and structure due to the attempts to discuss transhumanism et al. in the same thread. Soon, perhaps.

Shaalira D'arc.
Well said. Of course we cannot truly paint human civilisation as progress ever marching forward -- there will be periods of faster and slower progression, intervals of regression, branch points and, yes, dead ends.

However, it was said earlier here that, unless some great secret is known and hidden from all but a few, the future cannot be mapped with any reliability. The civilisations in the past that have reached such dead ends are numerous, but if we cannot see where we are going, what is there to do but try and direct ourselves to the best of our abilities with what we know now? Arguably, we have an excellent chance now. We see the ruins of innumerable past civilisations, and are perhaps witness to the collapse of yet another; we can at least speculate as to their mistakes and endeavour to avoid them ourselves. For instance, can we not look upon the crumbling (or passed) Directorate and take it as, at least in part, a cautionary tale?

You closing point is, of course, inherently political and I do not believe it to be worth the time for either of us, or anybody else in this thread, to try and convince one another that their answer to it is the only "correct one". That is no excuse not to offer explanation, however. I tread a dangerous line between inciting a political discussion and providing a response, here, and I would respectfully ask that any expressly political reaction to this be moved elsewhere or restrained, for the sake of maintaining a hitherto stimulating thread. That being said:

It is, I think, a difference in perception that here creates the biggest divide. Sansha Kuvakei is, yes, a human being, and human beings are flawed, petty, jealous, and lustful creatures. However, what have we been discussing but the excision of human flaws, ultimately? It is no secret that the Nation is highly capable in the field of neurological modification, whatever your thoughts thereon -- why, then, should its founder and architect go without these improvements?

The lowering of barriers and the unification of consciousness is an easy thing to see as being "thrall to the vision" of a single Master. It is just not an equivalence I happen to draw in the case of Sansha's Nation.

Deceiver's Voice.
I cannot deny, the forceful imposition of will can be a great tool for harm -- what have the countless wars in the cluster been but that, at least before the Capsuleer flourished enough for those between their own organisations to take on an element of sport, for some?

Likewise, attempting to fix everything one sees is a recipe for disaster. One person may be able to fix one, several, or even a great deal of things, given enough time, but everything most definitely lies outside the skillset of any given individual. It is fortunate, then, that we as a species are capable of co-operation with other human beings.

I hesitate to indulge the line of inquiry about the Nation, owing to the similarity to that which I said in response to Ms. D'arc; it would seem that much of those paragraphs is similarly applicable here. There are, granted, some points that do not overlap. It has typically been the case that one imposition of will leads to the next, if only to stop the first. An unfortunate trend, but one that has held quite consistently thus far. However much I may wish that it were otherwise, on occasion it is necessary to impose will to prevent those who would do harm from imposing theirs. With luck, that harm will cease and imposition all around can stop.

Of course, I realise that I have just recited the same justification procured for a great many campaigns throughout history. "We did what we did to stop those people doing bad things".

A question might be whether this is preferable, or if the alternative of detaching oneself from the situation entirely and letting them come to a conclusion amongst themselves is better. Again, no strictly "right" or "wrong" answer, but I once again find myself wondering what various Capsuleers think here.

Cpt. Moros,

my issue here is with the idea of a copy that is truly identical with the original. I'm of the strong opinion that such a thing is an oxymoron. In the case you give it either doesn't make sense at all to speak of copy and original (and maybe more of co-created pieces of art, both original as twins) or it's merely an epistemological problem that we can't decide what is what.

Also, a painting is more than just it's physical constituents. I'm not a bit swayed by your arguments given to show that it is. But even if one would accept this: In the case of co-creation the two pieces might be indistinguishable but they are still not identical. They must have been created at different times and the artist that can create two pieces with the exact same strokes while being in the exact same state at two different times is, I think, as much of a paradox as the copy that is identical with its original. It's a mere thought experiment, that's showing that we can't think of something like that without getting into self-contradictory statements.

I really don't see how the copy could have the property of originality that the original has - indeed, the more exact the copy the less originality it does exhibit by necessity - nor can I see how this originality can be reduced to the material constituents and their spacial distribution.

As I don't see how your criteria hold up for a piece of art, I can't see how they should for a person. The thing is, if a brain-state is emulated outside of a human brain, say in silico, then it's not a brain state, as it's not the state of a brain. It's because of that alone just not the same as the brain-state that a human has, but something else: An emulation is, like a copy or a duplicate by definition not identical with what is emulated. It might be functionally identical for all practical purposes. That doesn't make it identical in all respects, though.

Also it's a question whether an 'infomorphic imprint' that has been active on a non-brain platform is at all able to enter back into the relation that is proper for it in the whole that the human is. But even if this is so and one can switch back and forth, this doesn't mean that the notion of "being human" is made rather insignificant: What's making it insignificant is the assumption that if one can switch back and forth than 'being human' is an insignificant notion. This is an assumption one doesn't need to make, though. It's implicated by nothing we said so far. I'd venture the position that whether the notion of and 'being human' in itself is significant depends on other factors than this.

For a materialist, a physicalist, that is someone for whom only the paradigm of natural sciences produces meaningful propositions, there is little significance in the notion of 'being human' to start with. Significance and value are things which have little space in an hardened empiricists dogma, especially if they're considered in their absolutes. That is the effect of such a world-view which I hold to be deeply impoverished in relation to a world view that encompasses sciences, but sees the limits of the scientific method and allows for what lies beyond.

Stricto sensu, as I said above, it can not be 100% the same if you take its position into space and the particules it is composed of (even if of the same type). Everything else is the same, in this theoretical concept, which is, of course, impossible to find currently in our reality.




I am afraid that I do not understand your reasoning. That does not make any sense to me. I also do not see how being an original is valuable. You start by a different assumption than me, which I do not share.



You confuse everything. What lies behind an object (history, work, symbols, etc), are abstract concepts that lie behind. They are not the object, they are merely a layer of feelings (or philosophical concepts as you say) that every individual chooses to apply and that is also different depending on said individual, unlike the physical properties of the object in question.

I share captain Vechtor and Mr Moros views.



I see your point but again, my definitions are not the same and believe that abstract concepts revolving around an object are not to be confused with its physical properties. A painting, even a copy, is a painting done by the painter. The way all the pigments are assembled is not the fruit of the person who copied it, but the fruit of the author itself. This is exactly why abstract concepts like history are not tied to their physical location and matter.

Also, it is worthy to note that as I said above, a copy being 100% identical (lets use identitcal instead of "the same", the latter being unproper as it would involve the exact same spatial properties), is only 100% identical at t=0, time of the copying.



Well then, that is a definition issue. I prefer to put the human part on the mind and infomorph instead of linking it to the flesh, which is a totally outdated concept still in debate behind the Theology Council doors for religious purposes.


Edit : I think two human concepts are to be separated. The one strictly speaking about the species, which is directly tied to the body, DNA, etc, and the one that strictly refer to Mankind. The species is homo sapiens, where the human mind goes beyond this, and this is exactly why continuing to consider the body and the mind indivisible is a great mistake, especially in our current era.