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Experiments in Theology

Author
Stitcher
School of Applied Knowledge
Caldari State
#101 - 2013-01-17 18:04:56 UTC  |  Edited by: Stitcher
Silas Vitalia wrote:
Mr. Sticher,

You are not Amarr.


My ethnicity is not in any way relevant to the factual accuracy of my opinions, neither is it relevant to my qualification to express said opinions, nor my capacity for knowledge and understanding.

and for goodness' sake there are TWO "t"s in my callsign. I may not like my callsign very much but you could at least spell it properly.

AKA Hambone

Author of The Deathworlders

Jinari Otsito
Otsito Mining and Manufacture
#102 - 2013-01-17 18:07:20 UTC
Stitcher wrote:
Silas Vitalia wrote:
Mr. Sticher,

You are not Amarr.


My ethnicity is not in any way relevant to the factual accuracy of my opinions.

and for goodness' sake there are TWO "t"s in my callsign. I may not like my callsign very much but you could at least spell it properly.


I swear this is true. I've seen you referred to as "Varyn Sticker Hamakatani".

Prime Node. Ask me about augmentation.

Nicoletta Mithra
Societas Imperialis Sceptri Coronaeque
Khimi Harar
#103 - 2013-01-17 18:14:17 UTC
Stitcher wrote:
The terms "positive claim" and "negative claim" exist for a reason.

What I'm affirming by saying "God does not exist" is that for the purposes of this particular hypothesis, the "God exists" claim is in its "off" state. When I declare something to be "not true", then I'm not describing it as being in some active state of "not-trueness", I am describing it as not being in a state of trueness. Hence, it is a negative claim. Negative claims are not provable, but when defining what our hypothesis is they are used to define the "settings" of the hypothesis

okay?

No, not okay. As I pointed out already pointed out ¬A(X) isn't quite the same as A(¬X): While the latter implies the former, the former doesn't imply the latter. A negative claim is a claim that claims a negative (that is: A(¬X)), not negating the claiming (which is: ¬A(X)). Also, as I already pointed out above and I even linked and quoted a authoritative source: Negative claims are just as provable as positive claims.

[/quote]Having established that, we now see that if we treat the negative claim "god does not exist" as a positive claim in its own right, then every other unspoken negative claim must also be treated as a positive claim. If that were the case then the law of parsimony could never be applied because any two competing hypotheses would always involve making the precise same number of assumptions - one for every possible statement regarding every possible thing or group of things.[/quote]
Well, we don't treat "god does not exist" as positive claim. All claims - be they of the type A(X) or A(¬X), that is positive and negative claims - have to be listed and get into the calculation if you apply the heuristic of the law of parsimony. What doesn't go in are non-claims, that is propositons of the type ¬A(X).

Quote:
I don't need to go through the complete list of possible assumptions I could be making but am not, I need only list the ones that I AM making and maybe define a few of the ones I'm explicitly not for comparative purposes.

And therefore you need to list the assumptions you make that are containing a negative.

Quote:
If I say "God does not exist", then all I'm doing is being clear that god is now excluded from the list of assumptions. That statement doesn't place god in some strange meta-category of "things that don't exist", it just doesn't place him in the category of things that do.

Yes, it does place god in the logical category of "things that don't exist" if you say "God does not exist". If you want to express that god is not assumed by you, you say "I don't believe in God" or "I don't assume that God exists".

You claim to be rational and to strive for truth when not even familiar with these really basic rules of modal logic? Worse, when you ignore them and state things in direct conflict with doxastic modal logic? I don't think you are.
Stitcher
School of Applied Knowledge
Caldari State
#104 - 2013-01-17 18:18:41 UTC  |  Edited by: Stitcher
Nicoletta Mithra wrote:
Well, we don't treat "god does not exist" as positive claim. All claims - be they of the type A(X) or A(¬X), that is positive and negative claims - have to be listed and get into the calculation if you apply the heuristic of the law of parsimony. What doesn't go in are non-claims, that is propositons of the type ¬A(X).


Except that is how I'm treating it, regardless of whether or not I should be.

You're not at liberty to decide what I mean. If you don't understand me I can attempt a better explanation, but at no stage are you at liberty to tell me what I mean, what I believe and what I think.

I've told you that's what I mean, therefore that's what I mean. If my usage is incorrect I apologise, but I have told you my intended meaning and would appreciate it if you addressed the argument, rather than the manner in which I expressed that argument.

But to be clear: when you are dealing with me in my capacity as an agnostic atheist, all statements I may make to the effect that A(¬X) should be read as ¬A(X) for the simple reason that our shared means of communication struggles to express the difference in a concise and fluent way. "god does not exist" is a much simpler sentence that uses less of my character budget than "The hypothesis that god exists is not true" therefore I default to that, even if the latter is a more accurate representation of my meaning.

AKA Hambone

Author of The Deathworlders

Silas Vitalia
Doomheim
#105 - 2013-01-17 18:36:01 UTC
Stitcher wrote:


My ethnicity is not in any way relevant to the factual accuracy of my opinions, neither is it relevant to my qualification to express said opinions, nor my capacity for knowledge and understanding.



Your very choice of words here validates my point and shows your lack of understanding on this matter.

You are an outsider. You will always only see words on a page, and I'm sure you have many logical axioms that prove conclusively and without a doubt why your opinions are the right ones. How clever!




Stitcher wrote:

and for goodness' sake there are TWO "t"s in my callsign. I may not like my callsign very much but you could at least spell it properly.


Whatever you say Mr. Sticher!

Sabik now, Sabik forever

Jinari Otsito
Otsito Mining and Manufacture
#106 - 2013-01-17 18:42:21 UTC
Silas Vitalia wrote:
Stitcher wrote:


My ethnicity is not in any way relevant to the factual accuracy of my opinions, neither is it relevant to my qualification to express said opinions, nor my capacity for knowledge and understanding.



Your very choice of words here validates my point and shows your lack of understanding on this matter.

You are an outsider. You will always only see words on a page, and I'm sure you have many logical axioms that prove conclusively and without a doubt why your opinions are the right ones. How clever!


Stitcher wrote:

and for goodness' sake there are TWO "t"s in my callsign. I may not like my callsign very much but you could at least spell it properly.


Whatever you say Mr. Sticher!



How childish. I'd actually like to score a cheap shot and say something about how you're representative of the religious Amarrians, but that would be a little too cheap even for me. The actual faith is unbelievably stupid, but at least the believers aren't all the way down on your level.

Prime Node. Ask me about augmentation.

Nicoletta Mithra
Societas Imperialis Sceptri Coronaeque
Khimi Harar
#107 - 2013-01-17 18:52:09 UTC  |  Edited by: Nicoletta Mithra
Saede Riordan wrote:
Let me see if I get this correctly, forgive me, this is starting to go over my head.

You claim that rationality cannot make that distinction (God v. No God) without overreaching, because to do so is to go after the sort of fundemental axioms that rationality itself is comprised of, and thus liquefying its own foundations, herein lies the problem of induction. But the thing is, that problem only exists if God is considered a core axiom. We don't consider God to be a core axiom, and thus find Deity subject to the same rules of parsimony as everything else and discard on a basis of no evidence, whereas you, for one reason or another, consider God to be axiomatic to the same degree as Rationality, science, and the Observed nature of the universe. It is a core fundament to you unto itself. I'm afraid I don't understand. Why is that? What makes God a core axiom to you? What 'reasonable' process did you use to come to the that decision? Why do you add the axiom of God when we consider naturalism to be sufficient?

The problem exists not only if God is a core axiom: It just needs to be a proposition of the type that aren't justifiable by the scientific method, the base axioms of science are just one example of those claims. If I claim that "a god does exist" it's not a naturalistic claim. I don't claim that this god is a natural phenomenon, I merely claim that he exists. Thus, if you are a naturalist, you can't disprove the God hypothesis, unless you have first shown that nothing exists, if it's not part of nature.

The assumption that there is nothing outside of nature is in fact in a way the working basis of science: Science is naturalistic by its very nature and should be. But - and that's a big but! - it's a methodological naturalism. It doesn't imply that ontologically nothing exists outside of nature. It simply remains silent on that matter.

And there start the problems of epistemomological naturalism, which is the claim that one can only rationally know something if there is scientific evidence for it. Science already did exclude the non- or super-natural in a methodologic decision. If you now apply it as the only possible way to produce knowledge, you ruled out non-scientific knowledge. Not because there is no such thing, but simply because you earlier made the decision not to cover that subject.

Worse, even, the proposition that "one can only rationally know/believe something if there is scientific evidence for it" is itself lacking scientific evidence, just as the base axioms of science. Thus epistemological naturalism has some really deep problems and the paradoxes you run into if you embrace it are so nasty that I wouldn't have much hope of ever seeing them being solved, if I were you. There are really strong arguments for it being an irrational position.

If you have no problem to part with epistemological naturalism, you should be more equipped to defend an ontological naturalism that claims that nothing outside nature exists. You will have to use non-scientific methods to argue that point, though. Until now, though, no one came up with a convincing argument that there is nothing outside nature.

If you just want to go through with your scientific program and you only want to claim that "when doing science, I don't need the assumption of god" you're quite right and you are justified in that by your methodological decision. If nature is what you want to deal with, then you don't need to deal with the non- or super-natural, by virtue of that decision. That's part of what science is. It is, though, in a way obliging you to keep non-committal in regard to those things you don't deal with in your capacity as scientist - which of course doesn't prevent you from having opinions on the matter in other capacities.
Nicoletta Mithra
Societas Imperialis Sceptri Coronaeque
Khimi Harar
#108 - 2013-01-17 18:59:08 UTC  |  Edited by: Nicoletta Mithra
Stitcher wrote:
Except that is how I'm treating it, regardless of whether or not I should be.

You're not at liberty to decide what I mean. If you don't understand me I can attempt a better explanation, but at no stage are you at liberty to tell me what I mean, what I believe and what I think.

I've told you that's what I mean, therefore that's what I mean. If my usage is incorrect I apologise, but I have told you my intended meaning and would appreciate it if you addressed the argument, rather than the manner in which I expressed that argument.

But to be clear: when you are dealing with me in my capacity as an agnostic atheist, all statements I may make to the effect that A(¬X) should be read as ¬A(X) for the simple reason that our shared means of communication struggles to express the difference in a concise and fluent way. "god does not exist" is a much simpler sentence that uses less of my character budget than "The hypothesis that god exists is not true" therefore I default to that, even if the latter is a more accurate representation of my meaning.

Well, sure you mean what you mean, but your words don't convey what you intend them to. One shouldn't use a sentence that does convey an entirely different meaning, just to save up some characters. Also, "The hypothesis that god exists is not true" is not the same as ¬A(X) or the negation of assuming god (that is not assuming god) but is in fact the same as assuming that A(¬X), which means assuming that god doesn't exist. If you don't make the assumption that God exists and don't make at the same time the assumption that god does not exist, you you don't assert that "The hypothesis that god exists is not true" but that "the hypothesis that god exists is undecided in its truth value".
Stitcher
School of Applied Knowledge
Caldari State
#109 - 2013-01-17 19:49:16 UTC  |  Edited by: Stitcher
Alright. let's make this as clear as I'm able.

1: The law of parsimony states that between competing hypotheses, all other things being equal the one that requires the fewest assumptions is more likely to be true.

2: The terms "theism" and "atheism" concern only one subject and no other - whether or not a person believes in a god or gods.

3: Theism comes in two forms: Gnostic and Agnostic theism. Both forms mean, with regard to the subject of a god or gods, A(X)

4: Atheism also comes in Gnostic and Agnostic forms. However, their meanings are different.

5: Gnostic Atheism means that, with regard to the subject of a god or gods, A(¬X)

6: Agnostic Atheism means that, with regard to the subject of a god or gods, ¬A(X)

7: Theism and Gnostic Atheism are both equal assertions and make the same number of assumptions.

8: Agnostic Atheism is not an assertion and makes zero assumptions.

9: Agnostic Atheism is most likely to be correct, according to the law of parsimony.

10: Because theism and atheism are statements concerning only a single specific subject, any hypothesis no matter what it may be which involves a theistic stance [A(X)] contains one more assumption than an otherwise identical hypothesis based on an agnostic atheistic stance [¬A(X)] and is therefore less likely to be correct.

*

Another way to express it would be to give numeric values to the following statements:

A(X) "God exists" = 1
¬A(X) "The possibility of god existing is not being considered" = 0
A(¬X) "God does not exist" = -1

...and say that the law of parsimony means that between competing hypotheses, all other things being equal the one requiring the number of assumptions closest to 0 assumptions is most likely to be true.

*

There are other issues. For starters, parsimony, the razor, whatever you want to call it, is not in itself proof of a hypothesis' accuracy, but rather gives us the information to adjust our probability tables.

Secondly, the law of parsimony applies only if all other factors are equal

In order to be considered "true" or to be accepted as a working theory, the hypothesis must be demonstrated and proven. Demonstrating and proving a hypothesis requires producing supporting evidence for all of its component parts, including its assumptions (correctly, "null hypotheses")

As such, any hypothesis founded upon an assumption which has no supporting evidence is not equal to a hypothesis for which all the assumptions DO have supporting evidence and the razor does not apply.

In other words, in order to be considered sufficiently equal to an agnostic atheist argument for the razor to apply in the first place, (and as we've established, in such a contest the agnostic atheist argument wins), any hypothesis which includes a god must first provide evidence for the existence of said god. Which would then render the razor comparison irrelevant, of course.

It all comes back down to evidence. We can argue about parsimony and suchlike, but until such time as there is good solid proof on the table to demonstrate the existence of your or any other deity, such arguments are moot points.

Reality, you see, doesn't care about our ability to engage each other in twisting duels of logic and philosophy - what's true is true, and what's not true is not true. What exists, exists and what doesn't, doesn't. No matter how clever it may be, nor how poetic, nor how appealing, an argument for god is not, and never will be, evidence of god. The evidence for god is something that we argue about, rather than argue into being.

You've taught me a valuable lesson about how to clearly and properly express myself, Pilot Mithra, and for that I am sincerely grateful. But you've not convinced me that your stance is correct - quite the reverse, you've only reinforced my understanding that it is not. I also think that if you could be deconverted, you would have been by now. Maybe there's more to learn from this conversation, but at this point I think the time really has come - and I know I've said it before but by the Kariola I intend to stick to it this time - to bring this conversation to a close.

Thank you for an intellectually stimulating time.

AKA Hambone

Author of The Deathworlders

Nicoletta Mithra
Societas Imperialis Sceptri Coronaeque
Khimi Harar
#110 - 2013-01-17 23:25:55 UTC  |  Edited by: Nicoletta Mithra
Ah, no. First you jumble doxastic and epistemic modalities. You need to take into account the doxastic operator "it is believed that" as well as the two epistemic operators "x knows that" and "for all x knows, it may be true that" and also you need to take into account the alethic modalities (possible and necessary), if you want to give the topic a thorough treatment.

For simplicities sake though, we can roughly say that Gnostic Theism and Atheism are the positions that one knows whether God exists or not and assumes what one knows. Agnostic Theism and Atheism are the positions that one does not know whether god exists or not, but assumes that he doesn't exist or does not exist. Thus, they would be properly chracterized as:

Gnostic Theism: K(X) ˄ A(X)
Gnostic Atheism: K(¬X) ˄ A(¬X)
Agnostic theism: ¬K(X ˄ ¬X) ˄ A(X)
Agnostic atheism: ¬K(X ˄ ¬X) ˄ A(¬X)

The number of assumptions is in all cases equal. The position that you ascribe to agnostic atheism is actually the position of agnosticism proper: ¬K(X ˄ ¬X) ˄ ¬A(X ˄ ¬X). (The three possibilities in regard to the doxastic modality: Agosticism: ¬A(X ˄ ¬X), Atheism: A(¬X) and Theism: A(X). The gostic/agnostic varieties being produced by adding the epistemic "x knows that" operator in regard to the content of the assumption while staying consistent between the modalities as can be seen above.)

Also, it really doesn't all come down to evidence. Scientific evidence depends on axioms that scientific evidence can't possibly justify or provide any foundation for. One can evidence something out of being as little as one can argue something into being. Neither argument nor evidence are there to produce truths, they are there to make truths known.

Your epistemological naturalism is irrational, though, whether you like it or not - that is a reality, made known by logic.

As to what my stance is, you probably just began to grasp it. But I'm happy you started along the way to sharpen your ability to express yourself properly. Keep studying logics and I'm sure you'll further improve.

Regards,
N. Mithra
Saede Riordan
Alexylva Paradox
#111 - 2013-01-18 00:11:43 UTC
Nicoletta Mithra wrote:
Saede Riordan wrote:
Let me see if I get this correctly, forgive me, this is starting to go over my head.

You claim that rationality cannot make that distinction (God v. No God) without overreaching, because to do so is to go after the sort of fundemental axioms that rationality itself is comprised of, and thus liquefying its own foundations, herein lies the problem of induction. But the thing is, that problem only exists if God is considered a core axiom. We don't consider God to be a core axiom, and thus find Deity subject to the same rules of parsimony as everything else and discard on a basis of no evidence, whereas you, for one reason or another, consider God to be axiomatic to the same degree as Rationality, science, and the Observed nature of the universe. It is a core fundament to you unto itself. I'm afraid I don't understand. Why is that? What makes God a core axiom to you? What 'reasonable' process did you use to come to the that decision? Why do you add the axiom of God when we consider naturalism to be sufficient?

The problem exists not only if God is a core axiom: It just needs to be a proposition of the type that aren't justifiable by the scientific method, the base axioms of science are just one example of those claims. If I claim that "a god does exist" it's not a naturalistic claim. I don't claim that this god is a natural phenomenon, I merely claim that he exists. Thus, if you are a naturalist, you can't disprove the God hypothesis, unless you have first shown that nothing exists, if it's not part of nature.

The assumption that there is nothing outside of nature is in fact in a way the working basis of science: Science is naturalistic by its very nature and should be. But - and that's a big but! - it's a methodological naturalism. It doesn't imply that ontologically nothing exists outside of nature. It simply remains silent on that matter.

And there start the problems of epistemomological naturalism, which is the claim that one can only rationally know something if there is scientific evidence for it. Science already did exclude the non- or super-natural in a methodologic decision. If you now apply it as the only possible way to produce knowledge, you ruled out non-scientific knowledge. Not because there is no such thing, but simply because you earlier made the decision not to cover that subject.

Worse, even, the proposition that "one can only rationally know/believe something if there is scientific evidence for it" is itself lacking scientific evidence, just as the base axioms of science. Thus epistemological naturalism has some really deep problems and the paradoxes you run into if you embrace it are so nasty that I wouldn't have much hope of ever seeing them being solved, if I were you. There are really strong arguments for it being an irrational position.

If you have no problem to part with epistemological naturalism, you should be more equipped to defend an ontological naturalism that claims that nothing outside nature exists. You will have to use non-scientific methods to argue that point, though. Until now, though, no one came up with a convincing argument that there is nothing outside nature.

If you just want to go through with your scientific program and you only want to claim that "when doing science, I don't need the assumption of god" you're quite right and you are justified in that by your methodological decision. If nature is what you want to deal with, then you don't need to deal with the non- or super-natural, by virtue of that decision. That's part of what science is. It is, though, in a way obliging you to keep non-committal in regard to those things you don't deal with in your capacity as scientist - which of course doesn't prevent you from having opinions on the matter in other capacities.


That's a lot of words to not actually answer my question.
Let me make it really simple: your belief is agnostic, you believe God(s) can't be examined scientifically because they are outside the scope of science. Why do you see it this way? Why is God set apart from everything else in your worldview in this manner?
Scherezad
Revenent Defence Corperation
Ishuk-Raata Enforcement Directive
#112 - 2013-01-18 00:30:43 UTC
Nicoletta Mithra wrote:
Gnostic Theism: K(X) ˄ A(X)
Gnostic Atheism: K(¬X) ˄ A(¬X)
Agnostic theism: ¬K(X ˄ ¬X) ˄ A(X)
Agnostic atheism: ¬K(X ˄ ¬X) ˄ A(¬X)


Ms. Mithra;

I fear that your above calculation may reveal an error. (X ˄ ¬X) is a contradiction, or a damp in the parlance of my own field. It is a condition that is always false and, thus, carries no information. ¬K(X ˄ ¬X) is therefore always true, and again, carries no information. Therefore, your statement above is equivalent to (and should be reduced to):

Agnostic theism: T ˄ A(X)
Agnostic atheism: T ˄ A(¬X)

Which, by Universal Simplification, yields

Agnostic theism: A(X)
Agnostic atheism: A(¬X)

Do you mean to imply that agnosticism simply does not exist as a meaningful position? Because this is the form your calculations have taken. In my own experience, encountering an unplanned dampener or activator in my calculations is a sure sign that an error has been made earlier on.
Nicoletta Mithra
Societas Imperialis Sceptri Coronaeque
Khimi Harar
#113 - 2013-01-18 08:48:50 UTC
Saede Riordan wrote:
That's a lot of words to not actually answer my question.
Let me make it really simple: your belief is agnostic, you believe God(s) can't be examined scientifically because they are outside the scope of science. Why do you see it this way? Why is God set apart from everything else in your worldview in this manner?

The point is why should it be inside the scope of science to begin with? It was never meant as a claim about natural things. Science is deliberately choosing to opnly deal with nature though and thus can only deal with claims about natural things. God isn't set apart from everything else in that manner: Qualia for example can't be fully accounted of by science either.
Nicoletta Mithra
Societas Imperialis Sceptri Coronaeque
Khimi Harar
#114 - 2013-01-18 10:10:00 UTC  |  Edited by: Nicoletta Mithra
Scherezad wrote:
Nicoletta Mithra wrote:
Gnostic Theism: K(X) ˄ A(X)
Gnostic Atheism: K(¬X) ˄ A(¬X)
Agnostic theism: ¬K(X ˄ ¬X) ˄ A(X)
Agnostic atheism: ¬K(X ˄ ¬X) ˄ A(¬X)


Ms. Mithra;

I fear that your above calculation may reveal an error. (X ˄ ¬X) is a contradiction, or a damp in the parlance of my own field. It is a condition that is always false and, thus, carries no information. ¬K(X ˄ ¬X) is therefore always true, and again, carries no information. Therefore, your statement above is equivalent to (and should be reduced to.

Yes, one can't know a contradiction, but then ¬K(X ˄ ¬X) → ¬K(X) ˄ ¬K(¬X). As K(X) ˄ ¬K(¬X) and ¬K(X) ˄ K(¬X) are possible, therefore the proposition ¬K(X ˄ ¬X) isn't always true and carries information.

As Mr. Stitcher pointed out existence is boolean, thus K(X ˅ ¬X). ¬K(X ˄ ¬X) seems to be problematic as K(X ˅ ¬X) → K(X) ˅ K(¬X). It is meaningful, though, as long as we can't epistemologically decide which part of the disjunction in K(X ˅ ¬X) is to be known.

P.S.: The statment K¬(X ˄ ¬X) would be a tautology - you see the importance of considering on what the negation operates?
Jev North
Doomheim
#115 - 2013-01-18 10:17:56 UTC
Nicoletta Mithra wrote:
God isn't set apart from everything else in that manner: Qualia for example can't be fully accounted of by science either.

Oh, well there's a neat little word to draw my attention. "Can't" as in our current understanding does not reach far enough to provide a satisfactory scientific explanation, or "can't" as in the subject matter can't be meaningfully explained by science by definition? There are large issues looming ahead no matter which fork in the road you take.

Even though our love is cruel; even though our stars are crossed.

Nicoletta Mithra
Societas Imperialis Sceptri Coronaeque
Khimi Harar
#116 - 2013-01-18 10:26:32 UTC  |  Edited by: Nicoletta Mithra
Jev North wrote:
Nicoletta Mithra wrote:
God isn't set apart from everything else in that manner: Qualia for example can't be fully accounted of by science either.

Oh, well there's a neat little word to draw my attention. "Can't" as in our current understanding does not reach far enough to provide a satisfactory scientific explanation, or "can't" as in the subject matter can't be meaningfully explained by science by definition? There are large issues looming ahead no matter which fork in the road you take.

Now, read what I wrote: Qualia can't be fully accounted of by science. It's a logical truth that science can't account fully for qualia, as per definitions of science and qualia. Or put another way: It's logically impossible for science to fully account for qualia.

Can science explain qualia? Sure, but it's always a partial explanation (even though it's a full explanation by the methodological decisions that science made - a full scientific explanation is always possibly a partial explanation). But then partial explanations can be meaningful.
Jev North
Doomheim
#117 - 2013-01-18 10:42:22 UTC  |  Edited by: Jev North
Ah, very well; then it becomes important what definition of qualia you're operating under. Although there's some general agreement that they refer to individual instances of subjective experience, there are many and varied definitions.

I'm not terribly impressed by the ones that include non-materialism or inexplicability in the definition; "the parts of sense datums that are beyond the reach of science to explain" may, after all, turn out to be as vacuous a concept as "the parts of thunderstorms that are beyond the reach of science to explain."

(Post-scriptum - in hindsight, my apologies. I need to watch my trigger words. It seems the last thing this discussion needs is another tangent. Some other time and place, perhaps?)

Even though our love is cruel; even though our stars are crossed.

Saede Riordan
Alexylva Paradox
#118 - 2013-01-18 17:38:03 UTC
Jev North wrote:

I'm not terribly impressed by the ones that include non-materialism or inexplicability in the definition; "the parts of sense datums that are beyond the reach of science to explain" may, after all, turn out to be as vacuous a concept as "the parts of thunderstorms that are beyond the reach of science to explain."


This is what I was trying to get at. I guess I would classify myself as a gnostic atheist in this way. There is nothing that is entirely beyond understanding. It may just be beyond our current understanding presently. No one now doubts the process that causes lightning, just because something is not understood, does not mean it cannot by definition be understood. The argument that you seem to be trying to make Mithra, is that God is entirely beyond the scope of science, simply by process of definition.

But why is this? Why do you view the existence or lack their of, of God to be completely out of reach of science? I would really like a solid answer, and not examples of places science can't go. I want to know why you don't think God is something science can touch?

Nicoletta Mithra
Societas Imperialis Sceptri Coronaeque
Khimi Harar
#119 - 2013-01-18 17:51:59 UTC
Jev North wrote:
(Post-scriptum - in hindsight, my apologies. I need to watch my trigger words. It seems the last thing this discussion needs is another tangent. Some other time and place, perhaps?)

Sure, it's an interesting debate.

Saede Riordan wrote:
But why is this? Why do you view the existence or lack their of, of God to be completely out of reach of science? I would really like a solid answer, and not examples of places science can't go. I want to know why you don't think God is something science can touch?

Because the god-hyposthesis isn't a scientific nor a naturalistic hypothesis.
Saede Riordan
Alexylva Paradox
#120 - 2013-01-18 18:15:22 UTC
But why believe it then? What gives it weight to you, if its not in any way able to be validated? Its just a hypothesis. I can hypothesize that there is a dragon in my hanger, but I don't have a reason to. What reason do you have for believing the merit of the God hypothesis?