Intergalactic Summit

Oh, that must have been a misunderstanding: I was not asking for a reasonable demonstration of the use of inductive proving (as inductive proof is only possible with the mathematical inductive method anyway, which is an application of deductive logic), but to provide a legitimate demonstration, that is a logical proof, that inductive reasoning (in general) is justified.


I do see it as a valid demonstration (in the sense of 'presentation' but not in the sense of logical demonstration, that is proof) of a reasonable deductive argument (as mathematical induction is deductive). I don't see it as logical proof that inductive reasoning in general or deductive reasoning in general are justified - as it's not even aimed at providing that proof.

Also, be assured that your statements in no way undermine my beliefs, in fact they do quite the opposite.


Indeed: As my claim is that logical reasoning can't account for itself by necessity, I requested to provide proof that the fundament of every logical reasoning, be it deductive or inductive, is justified. It is in fact a very interesting point that mathematics gives a set of criteria for the axioms. I think this is exactly because axioms (unless redundant) cannot be derived by principles of deduction, nor are they demonstrable by mathematical proofs, simply because they are starting points; there is nothing else from which they logically follow otherwise they would be classified as theorems. Next to the axioms one would still have to show that the other foundation of mathematical proof is valid: deductive reasoning.


Infact mathematical induction and philosophical induction are quite different: Mathematical induction is a case of what philosophers refer to as "deduction" or deductive reasoning, which is in stark contrast to what philosophers refer to as "induction" or inductive reasoning. While deductive reasoning is rigorous, in the sense of mathmatical rigour, inductive reasoning is non-rigorous and thus don't provide proof but provide inductive probability and thus support for the conclusion. It suggests truth of the conclusion, but does not ensure it.


I don't agree with you opinion that philosophy must yield to science – just as mathematics shouldn't yield to science. First, similar to mathematics, philosophy provides the fundament needed for the exercise of any natural science or science in general. Second, natural science can't justify itself: it needs philosophy for that. Third: There are fields of philosophy like ethics or aesthetics that have no necessary relation to the sciences.

Faithfully,
N. Mithra

It really is the same with reason. That's why skepticism prevails until today. Logical reasoning and the divine are not entirely equal, that is true, but they are equal in the respect of their justifiability.

Reformed epistemology is just another exercise in religious naval gazing, and it fails for the same reason as the watch maker argument.

Many rationalists argue that the watchmaker argument fails because it is a circular argument, god would have to have a creator himself if such an argument were valid. Only, for a rationalist, this shouldn't be a problem. The universe could be infinite, an infinite regression of intelligent life is logically possible. The argument fails because it fails to ask the question, "How do we know that a watch is made by a watch maker?"

We know, the same way we know that a birds nest was made by birds, or that an anthill was made by ants. It is something we have learned. A cave man would have no idea that a watch was made by his own species.

How do we know of religion? Why do the Amarr have specific practices that they follow? They have learned these beliefs, they have learned these practices. The adoption of belief and facts are not fundamentally different.

Cogito ergo sum - the only absolute truth one can know is that you exist. Everything else that you know as a fact requires a degree of faith to accept. It is reasonable to accept something as fact if the degree of evidence is enough to justify the magnitude of the claim that is being made.

I am conscious, this is self evident to me. I see and feel that I have a body, my senses tell me this. They may be wrong, but I also see other bodies who communicate in a similar fashion to me, and what I know of biology tells me that they work in a similar function. So I think it is reasonable to believe that they are also conscious, and that we are sharing an external, objective reality.

All but the first sentence in that paragraph is a statement of belief, but the justifiably of those statements is not equal to belief in the divine. Belief in the divine has a degree of justifiability, but the magnitude of such a claim is huge, and the evidence to support it comes from tradition and hear-say. It is not reasonable to accept it as fact.

We are emotional creatures, we are not motivated by reason, or faith. Emotion places value on what observe and think and we go from there. I value reason because of the emotional attachment I have to the concept. Practitioners of religion place value on tradition for the same reason.

Belief in the divine is the result of placing value on tradition, a value that has not been tested through empirical observation, and incorporating those values into a reasoning process. As such, people with such beliefs literally do not know what they are talking about when they speak of their own religious beliefs. They do not understand their own beliefs because they have not been tested with the process by which facts - and faith - are measured.

Cpt. Braitai,

first, I'm not making the statement that reformed epistemology is making here, so, I'd appreciate if you'd stay on topic. Second, the cartesian "cogito ergo sum" isn't quite as self-evident as you paint it here, it's far from being an absolute truth. It presupposes for example that the inference from "cogito" to "sum" is a valid one. Third, the claim that logical reasoning works is just as big of a magnitude a claim as the claim that the divine exists: if you want to claim that it is not, be prepared to show how it is smaller.

Also, the value of religion and belief in the divine have been empirically tested and those experiments have largely come to the conclusion that belief in the divine have a positive effect on the believer.

That aside, the scientific method is meant to produce facts about the natural world, so unless you subscribe to the philosophy of naturalism (which can't be shown to be any more justified that a religious world view by the scientific method, by the way) it's just not the method to measure faith. Obviously you have the same problem as Mr. Stitcher as you put faith in that scientific method, without having 'tested' it and it's foundations.

I can't blame you that you don't test the scientific method by itself, though, as that would be circular and thus not admissible. Neither can you test the logical reasoning that the scientific method presupposes by the scientific method: You can't test something, by something that presupposes it's validity. Similarly you can't test logical reasoning by itself. Thus your trust in the scientific method is as ungrounded in the scientific method and logical reasoning as the belief in the divine is.

So, your argument collapses on itself. - As you would have known if you had read the posts in the thread I linked.


Cpt. Ivory:

While you haven't been able to grasp the fullness of my formal argument, you seem to have a fair grip on the conclusion that follows in from it: Logical reasoning is too rigorous to account for everything reasonable. It's not a useful criterion for evaluating logical reasoning itself or whether belief in the divine is reasonable or not. The only thing it can evaluate is that some things are by necessity reasonable and some are not.

As careful analysis will show, this can't be done for either logical reasoning or belief in the divine - thus leaving both in the vast territory of things that may or not may be reasonable. Actually in the vast majority of cases we can't logically prove the rationality or irrationality of something.

So, I don't cling that hard to these thought patterns of rigorous logics: I do employ them though to show that they collapse on themselves if one clings to them like Mr. Stitcher does or Cpt. Braitat does apparently as well. It's an intrinsic criticism exclusive rationalism and of idolizing rationality like Mr. Stitcher does.

Faithfully,
N. Mithra

I hope the irony of hearing you saying that isn't lost on the audience.

This, basically.

I think his point was that he did want a debate, but it turned out not to be one, by any reasonable definition of it. I think he's right, in the end. Would you like some breadcrumbs, little pigeon?

So you claim: You still have to show it.


My criteria for proof are attainable. For example one can easily prove that 6=/=4. My contention is, that if you merely use utility as a criterion then you are assessing not whether reason is reasonable, but whether it is useful: And that if you go by this criterion you can't rule faith in the divine out, as it has been shown experimentally that faith in the divine is useful.

You are the one demanding proof that faith in the divine is rational: If you can't then in the same way provide proof for the rationality of rationality, your requirement is inadequate and irrational. I don't ignore the other proofs you bring up: They are merely not enough to rule faith in the divine out or are supporting that faith as much as the support logical reasoning.

Until now you failed to provide any method of assessing the validity of faith that would undermine it, but not undermine the validity of reason itself.


There's a difference between slavishly clinging to something like you do and adhering to them when they are useful.


See, Mr. Stitcher, this is a lovely example of an Ad Hominem, you claim my arguments are false because I'm a theist.


Well, I'm happy to see that you only produced smoke here and that you realized that.

The real tragedy of today is that people use "rational" and "reasonable" as if they would mean "I said so" and "I agree with this". A shame, really.

Well put. Science does not directly imply the absence of deities (it simply stays mute as regards to their presence or absence.) In other words, this is a case where an absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence. As to those who believe that religious tradition can answer all questions, here's a hint: Quote me the Scripture (or any other religious passage) that forces 2+3=5 to hold true. (The mathematical proof of such a fact is a different matter, of course; that'd be a job for Peano arithmetic.)